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Chapter 5: Legislative Initiatives and Technical Measures
5.1 Introduction
From logical and pragmatic perspectives, knowing the problem, risks associated therewith, 
and the ills resulting from online phishing is an important step towards a possible solution. 
Furthermore, such determination constitutes an integral part of devising effective vaccines 
and serums to eradicate and prevent this crime. Having described the problem and the 
diverse types of online phishing, we shall now address some of the potential solutions 
thereto. Thus, we shall first analyze the American approach, United Kingdom, and 
Singapore before we move to the technical solutions that aim to enhance privacy and 
provide a secure medium for data transfer in a manner that protects the confidentiality and 
integrity of personal information.
5.2 Legislative Initiatives
5.2.1 The United States
The United States is a Federal Republic and its Constitution allocates lawmaking authority 
between the federal and state levels in accordance with certain principles.118 Federal 
legislative jurisdiction is limited and is exercised only where intervention at that level is 
required such as where problems are national in scope and the solution lies in a uniform and 
consistent law that is common to all states. In that sense, computer crimes and cyber crimes 
that are easily perpetrated across borders and that are considered illegal in all states is a 
good example of an area of law that is susceptible to federal treatment. In actual fact, 
computer crime and cyber crime legislation have been formulated and adopted at both 
federal and state levels. 
                                                
118 See, U.S. CONST. Art. I § 8, which lists the United States Congress’ power to legislate in various areas; and U.S. CONST. Amend. X, 
which states that: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people.” 
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Due to the USA political structure, computer-related crime legislation and enforcement 
remain largely under state jurisdiction of prescription, adjudication and enforcement.119
Each state has its own unique set of criminal legislation and there is no formal mechanism 
compelling them to adopt uniform or consistent laws.120
The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) has defined “computer crime” as “any 
violations of criminal law that involve a knowledge of computer technology for their 
perpetration, investigation, or prosecution”,121 which for our purposes would be the same as 
“computer-related crime”. However, the DOJ had also further divided computer-related 
crimes into three categories according to the computer’s role in the particular crime: The 
computer as the “object” of a crime, as the “subject” of a crime (i.e. computer crimes for 
which there is no analogous traditional crime and for which special legislation is needed), 
or as an “instrument” of traditional crimes.122 This compartmentalization resembles the 
categorizations made under Part1.
Since 1984, the United States Congress has pursued a dual approach to combating 
computer crime.123 The Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Law of 
1984 and subsequent amending Acts address crimes in which the computer is the “subject”. 
This line of statutes culminated in the National Information Infrastructure Protection Act of 
1996 (NIIPA).124
The federal government’s approach to regulating crimes involving the computer as an 
“instrument” has been to update traditional criminal statutes in order to reach similar crimes 
                                                
119 See, Susan W. Brenner, State Cybercrime Legislation in the United States of America: A Survey, 7 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 28 (Winter 
2001), available at http://www.richmond.edu/jolt/v7i3/article2.html.
120 Except, for example, insofar as federal legislation preempts state laws where they conflict. However, there are many non-mandatory 
instruments that seek to persuade states to adopt laws in as similar a fashion as possible, including Restatements of Law, Uniform Acts 
and the Model Laws (e.g. the Model Penal Code).
121 NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., COMPUTER CRIME: CRIMINAL JUST. RESOURCE MANUAL 2 (1989). 
122 Ibid. at Note 1.
123 See, Dana L. Bazelon, Yun Jung Choi and Jason F. Conaty, Computer Crimes, 43 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 259, 264 (2006).
124 18 U.S. Code § 1030. The latest amendments came from the infamous Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act) as well as from the Cyber Security Enhancement 
Act of 2002 and the Computer Software Privacy and Control Act of 2004. Ibid. at 265-273.
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involving computers. The federal government has also used the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines (USSG) to enhance sentences for traditional crimes committed with the aid of 
computers. In fact, there have already been initiatives at the federal level to deal with cyber 
crimes and crime-specific legislation continues to surface at the national level that is worth 
serious consideration.125
There are several federal computer crime and cyber crime statutes including the omnibus 
federal computer crime/cyber crime statute which makes it an offence to, among other 
things, gain unauthorized entry to a computer and thereby gain access to information to 
which the perpetrator is not entitled to have access; and to gain unauthorized access to a 
computer and thereby further the perpetration of a fraud.126 These are essentially computer 
crime offences that are relevant to but not specifically applicable to phishing scams and 
other fraud schemes involving identity theft and, in certain cases, to further the objective of 
financial cheating or stealing from the primary target.
                                                
125 Ibid. at 273-290 (discussing the most prominent statutes that are used to prosecute traditional crimes committed with the aid of a 
computer). In relation to phishing and its relation to identity theft in particular, any number of federal legislation may be implicated 
depending on the method and objective of the perpetrator including statutes relating to wire fraud, credit card fraud, bank fraud, computer 
fraud, anti-spam and consumer protection. See, Matthew Bierlein and Gregory Smith, Internet: Privacy Year in Review: Growing 
Problems with Spyware and Phishing, Judicial and Legislative Developments in Internet Governance, and the Impacts on Privacy, 1 
ISJLP 279, 308-309 (2005). 
126 18 U.S. Code § 1030. The statute contains other computer-related offences as well. Other statutes include 18 U.S. Code § 1028 
(making it a crime to produce, transfer or possess a device, including a computer, that is intended to be used to falsify identification 
documents); and 18 U.S. Code § 2319 (making it a federal offense to infringe a valid copyright.). Other existing criminal statutes and 
provisions may also apply to computer-related transactions as well. For example, sex-related statutes such as 18 U.S. Code § 1462-1463 
(prohibiting the use of a computer to import obscene material into the United States or to transport such material in interstate or foreign 
commerce); 18 U.S. Code 2251-2252A (making it a crime to employ or to induce participation by a minor in the making of a visual 
depiction of a sexually explicit act if it was created using materials that had been transported, including by electronic means, in interstate 
or foreign commerce; prohibiting the use of a computer to sell or transfer custody of a minor knowing the minor will be used to create 
a visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct; and making it a crime to use a computer to transport child pornography in interstate or 
foreign commerce). For more on the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, see Reid Skibell, Cybercrimes & Misdemeanors: A Reevaluation of 
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 909 (2003); and Jo-Ann M. Adams, Controlling Cyberspace: Applying the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to the Internet, 12 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 403, 409 (1996). See also Sara R. Paul,
Identity Theft: Outline of Federal Statutes and Bibliography of Select Resources (LLRX.com, 18 September 2005), available at: 
http://www.llrx.com/features/idtheftguide.htm.
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More specifically in relation to phishing practices, a new federal law that is already in 
effect that is relevant to phishing, albeit indirectly, is the Identity Theft Penalty 
Enhancement Act of 2004 (ITPEA),127 which establishes the federal criminal offense of 
aggravated identity theft and creates more stringent means and stronger penalties to punish 
phishers. Legislation aimed directly at phishing practices was first introduced to the United 
States Congress in 2004,128 and again in 2005 in the form of the Anti-Phishing Act of 2005.
129 The Bill targets the entire scam process from the sending of the email to the creation of 
fraudulent sites.130 It stipulates that the perpetrator must have the specific criminal purpose 
of committing a crime of fraud or identity theft before an offence is made out.131
A feature of the bill that is worth promoting as a model for other jurisdictions for any 
international treaty on such offences is that it criminalizes the bait. This ‘poisoned bait’ 
approach criminalizes the conduct engaged in before the actual commission of the fraud. 
For example, it makes it illegal to knowingly send out spoofed email that links to false web 
sites, with the intention of committing a crime. It also criminalizes the operation of such 
                                                
127 18 U.S Code § 1028A. An individual commits aggravated identity theft if, while engaging in an enumerated identity theft related 
offense, the individual “knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person.” 
The commission of aggravated identity theft results in a mandatory minimum sentence of 2 years imprisonment in addition to the 
punishment imposed for the original offence. Ibid. at subsection (a)(1). See also DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DIVISION, 
SPECIAL REPORT ON “PHISHING”, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/Phishing.pdf.
128 It was introduced by Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont as an Act to criminalize Internet scams “involving fraudulently 
obtaining personal information, commonly known as phishing”. S. 2636, 108th Cong. (2004), available at: 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_cong_bills&docid=f:s2636is.txt.pdf. See U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy, 
Senate Floor Speech: New Leahy Bill Targets Internet “PHISHING” And “PHARMING” That Steal Billions Of Dollars Annually From 
Consumers (28 February 2005), available at: http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200503/030105.html. For an overview, see Robert Louis B. 
Stevenson, Plugging the “Phishing” Hole: Legislation Versus Technology, Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 6 (2005), available at: 
http://www.crime-research.org/analytics/phishing_duke/.
129 The 2005 Bill was similarly introduced by Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont for the same objective as the 2004 version. 
S. 472, 109th Cong. (2005), available at: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:S.472: and 
http://www.theorator.com/bills109/s472.html. See also, Grant Gross, Proposed Law Aims to Fight Phishing: Anti-Phishing Act of 2005 
Allows for Prison Time and Hefty Fines (IDG News Service, 5 March 2005), available at:  
http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid,119912,00.asp; Gearhead, Will the Anti-Phishing Act Make a Difference 
(NetworkWorld.com, 18 March 2005), available at: http://www.networkworld.com/weblogs/gearblog/2005/008234.html and 
http://www.internetnews.com/security/article.php/3487271.
130 The 2005 Bill is similar to the 2004 version and covers both phishing and pharming scams. Parody web sites, both commercial and 
political, are exempted from the penalties in the bill, thereby avoiding free speech issues and Constitutional impediments. 
131 The statute seeks to amend the fraud and identity statute by including specific provisions on Internet fraud. The statute is directed at 
those with the intention of carrying on any activity that would be a federal or state crime of fraud or identity theft. If an individual 
knowingly engages in cybersquatting or spoofs a domain name to induce or solicit an individual to provide information, he may be 
subject to a fine, imprisonment, or both. If an individual sends an email or other Internet communication, which falsely represents itself 
as being sent by a legitimate business, refers or links users to a cybersquatted or spoofed location, and induces or solicits personal 
information, he may be subject to the same punishment. For other relevant legislation, see also, the Internet False Identification 
Prevention Act of 2000 and the Fraudulent Online Identity Sanctions Act of 2004 (proposed amendment to the Trademark Act of 1946).
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web sites that are the locus of the wrongdoing. This creates an opportunity to prosecute 
before the actual fraud takes place, not just to successful phishing occurrences. It thus has a 
pre-emptive effect to such crimes and emphasizes the importance of deterrence and crime 
prevention.132 The penalty of imprisonment and fine are also appropriately strong and will, 
hopefully, provide greater deterrent effect. But even then there continue to exist territorial 
limitations, both in law (i.e. the reach of the legislation) and in fact (i.e. in actual and 
effective implementation and enforcement).133 The bill has also yet to be passed.134
The United States will continue to produce state-centric computer-related crime legislation 
as it does for other laws. However, two idiosyncrasies of cyberspace support greater federal 
involvement in computer-related criminal law making. First the ‘borderless’ nature of such 
criminal activities and the fact that jurisdictional rules that function effectively for physical 
activities do not translate well to the cyber realm.135 Second, the diversity in procedural 
augmentation has led to a confusing cacophony of state laws that exacerbates the 
jurisdictional problems of adjudication and enforcement.136 Seeking a consistent solution at 
                                                
132 The deterrent cum preventative aspect of legislation is very important, particularly to the primary policy objective of protecting and 
rebuilding trust and integrity in the Internet system of transaction. See Jennifer Lynch, Identity Theft in Cyberspace: Crime Control 
Methods and Their Effectiveness in Combating Phishing Attacks, 20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 259 298-299 (2005). See also Anita Ramasastry,
The Anti-Phishing Act of 2004: A Useful Tool Against Identity Theft (Findlaw Comentary, 16 August 2004), available at: 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ramasastry/20040816.html. Criminalizing after the fact and low rates of reporting and enforcement action 
makes existing federal laws that indirectly criminalizes phishing acts inadequate.
133 Another valid criticism is that currently many of the proposed solutions to phishing relates to the technique in general rather than the 
offence in particular. See Matthew Bierlein and Gregory Smith, Internet: Privacy Year in Review: Growing Problems with Spyware and 
Phishing, Judicial and Legislative Developments in Internet Governance, and the Impacts on Privacy, 1 ISJLP 279, 308-309 (2005). 
“[Many proposed solutions are still targeting spam in general and not the specific bad acts presented by phishing.” Ibid. at 280. This can 
be limiting particularly when technology and techniques vary and change.
134 Meanwhile, some states have already produced specific anti-phishing legislation. At the National Conference of State Legislatures 
web site at: http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/phishing06.htm, statistics show that as of 13 July 2006, ant-phishing bills have been 
introduced in at leas ten states and enacted in at least six states. See also, Hohn D. Saba, The Texas Legislature Goes Phishing, 68 Tex. 
B.J. 706 (2005); and HNS Staff, Details From the Anti-Phishing Act of 2005, (Net-Security.org, 5 October 2005) on California as the 
pioneering state to legislate against phishing.
135 E.g. where is a “harm caused”? Where is a criminal offence “committed”?
136 States have to varying extents amended or adopted legislation that target procedural and substantive issues relating to computer-related 
crime. Some have amended existing legislation in an attempt to update crime-specific statutes or general criminal statutes, while others 
have enacted entirely new laws. Jurisdiction, definitions and penalty provisions are just some of the changes made in an attempt to make 
their criminal law relevant to electronically perpetrated crimes. As one of the more technologically advanced countries in the world, the 
non-uniformity of treatment and lack of comprehensiveness of its substantive computer-related crime legislation is disappointing. The 
way the United States and many other jurisdictions have dealt with computer-related crime, that is, piecemeal and as it arises, can be 
analogized to how Microsoft continues to issue “patches” for its programs. It works to some extent, but not in a particularly satisfactory 
manner.
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the national level is preferable to sub-national efforts with varying degrees of 
effectiveness,137 particularly if the objectives of eliminating or at least reducing computer-
related crimes, through deterrence and punishment of offenders, are to be met.138 Years 
after the United States signed the Cybercrime Convention; the United States Senate finally 
ratified the Convention in August 2006 becoming the sixteenth country to do so.139 The 
significance of its ratification will only become apparent in time.140
5.2.2 The United Kingdom
The European community and its neighbouring countries influence the public policy and
laws of the United Kingdom. The Council of Europe (CoE) has issued a number of 
documents, which have influenced the British criminal justice system. For example, 
through its acknowledgement of the standards set by the CoE in its Cybercrime Convention 
as a signatory state, the United Kingdom signified its intention to bring the provisions 
under the Convention into effect within the country.141 The reason for the influence is the 
                                                
137 Indeed, the United States has produced more than forty different federals statutes that contain criminal provisions for computer-related 
crimes. See, Heather Jacobson and Rebecca Green, Computer Crimes, 39 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 273, 287-304 (2002); Eric J. Bakewell, 
Michelle Koldaro and Jennifer M. Tjia, Computer Crimes, 38 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 481, 287-304 (2001); Laura J. Nicholson, Tom F. 
Shebar and Meredith R. Weinberg, Computer Crimes, 37 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 207, 220-231 (2000); Michael Hatcher and Jay McDannell 
and Stacy Ostfeld, Computer Crimes, 36 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 397, 411-418 (1999); and Sheri A. Dillon, Douglas E. Groene and Todd 
Hayward, Computer Crimes, 35 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 503, 513-519 (1998).
138 The objectives of harmonization and consistent laws that are enforceable anywhere in the world are equally applicable here at the 
national plane. See below Part 3 on the “Objectives of Multilateralism”.
139 See Nate Anderson, “World’s Worst Internet Law” ratified by Senate (arstechnica.com, 4 August 2006), available at: 
http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20060804-7421.html. As noted, civil libertarians have criticized the move, warning of the potential 
problems associated with the apparent dispensation of the dual criminality requirement in some cases for law enforcement. See also, Dan 
Kaplan, Senate Ratification of Cybercrime Treaty Praised (SC Magazine, 4 August 2006), available at:
http://www.scmagazine.com/uk/news/article/576037/senate-ratification-cybercrime-treaty-praised/; and Anon., Senate Ratifies 
Convention on Cybercrime (Tech Law Journal, 3 August 2006), available at: 
http://www.techlawjournal.com/topstories/2006/20060803b.asp. 
140 Also, how this translates into its laws and how it will relate to existing federal and state laws will require closer examination. 
141 The U.K. Government was involved in the creation of two treaties on the prevention of cybercrime, under the CoE and the EU, both of 
which originated in Europe and both of which calls for international coordination to tackle abuses of computer systems. They are the 
Cybercrime Convention of 2001 and the E.U. Council Framework Decision on Attacks Against Information Systems (OJ L 069, 16 
March 2005), which was proposed on 19 April 2002, adopted on 24 February 2005 and required to be transposed into national law by 16 
March 2007 by member states.
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fact that European countries are a closely interconnected community of nations historically, 
geographically and economically.142
The United Kingdom computer crimes legislation is the Computer Misuse Act of 1990 
(CMA).143 The government is currently proposing amendments to the CMA to update it 
with more expansive provisions and stiffer penalties.144 The amendments have been sent to 
the House of Lords for consideration as part of the Police and Justice Bill.145 The only 
overlapping provision under the CMA with cyber crime offences is section 2 which makes 
it an offence to gain unauthorized access to any program or data held in any computer with 
the intention of committing or facilitating the commission of further offences that satisfy a 
set of criteria.146
Unlike the Cybercrime Convention that provides for both computer crime and cyber crime 
under one instrument, the United Kingdom itself has a distinctive dual track approach by 
enacting the CMA for computer crimes while leaving computer-enabled commission of 
more traditional offences to be dealt with under existing criminal legislation. Amendments 
to specific legislations and provisions have also been made to cover possible lacunas as a 
result of developments brought on by the advent of the electronic age. The application of 
                                                
142 In contrast, the United States is not strongly influenced by the rule of law of Europe. Even if the United States government adopts 
some of the propositions set out by the European community, it is not bound to the same extent that other European countries are bound.
143 The United Kingdom CMA is available at: http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1990/Ukpga_19900018_en_1.htm. For an overview, see 
generally, Martin Wasik, The Computer Misuse Act, 1990 Crim. L. Rev. 767. This CMA became the model and formed the template for 
many similar Acts in other Commonwealth jurisdictions including Singapore and Malaysia.
144 Although the United Kingdom pioneered computer crime legislation, it has since been overtaken in terms of its relevance by other 
countries such as Singapore, which has seen many changes to it since it has been originally enacted, in particular, taking into account new 
problems relating to the uses of the computer for communications and as the gateway to the Internet. See, Lilian Edwards, Dawn of the 
Death of Distributed Denial of Service: How To Kill Zombies, 24 Cardozo Arts & Ent LJ 23, 36 (2006).
145 See, Jeremy Kirk, Analysts Wary of U.K. Cybercrime Law Revamp: Tougher Penalties, But Can the Law Stay Up to Date? (IDG News 
Service, 7 June 2006), available at: 
http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&taxonomyName=Cybercrime_Hacking&articleId=90009
99&taxonomyId=82 and http://www.networkworld.com/news/2006/060706-analysts-eye-revamp-uk-cybercrime.html?prl. An earlier 
proposal for revision, the Computer Misuse Act 1990 (Amendment) Bill, 2004-2005, H.C. Bill [102], sponsored by the chair of the All 
Party Parliamentary Internet Group (APIG), fell through when Parliament was prorogued in April 2005.
146 Under subsection 2: “[O]ffences for which the sentence is fixed by law; or for which a person of twenty-one years of age or over (not 
previously convicted) may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of five years…” Cf. section 4 of the Singapore CMA.
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traditional criminal concepts to non-traditional acts and actors, instruments, information 
and products arising from new technology require amendments, in particular relating to 
definition, interpretation and scope. The United Kingdom government has done this for 
some of its legislation such as those pertaining to fraud and theft, pornography and 
intellectual property offences. 
With regards to amendments to fraud and theft legislation, which is relevant to our case 
study, section 2 of the CMA is a useful net to catch offences that are perpetrated through 
electronic means. Also, an offence of “obtaining a money transfer by deception”147 was 
created under the Theft Act of 1968, which required that property “belonging to another”148
must be obtained for fraud because it did not cover, for instance, an accounts-related fraud 
case where the data recorded in a set of accounts was altered, since it did not constitute the 
obtaining of property “belonging to another”.149 This appears to cover most phishing and 
related offences, since in all likelihood there will be some form of money transfer involved. 
However, the transfer of other financial or other assets such as something that is only of 
sentimental value, in particular those in digital form may not fall under either “money 
transfer” or “property”.150
In the meantime, in a new development, the Fraud Act was been enacted and passed by the 
Parliament, which is of direct relevance to the act of phishing and other such fraudulent 
                                                
147 Money can be transferred to a third party for the purchase of goods or it can be transferred to the offender’s own account.
148 Under the Act, “[a] person is guilty of theft, if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with the intention of 
permanently depriving the other of it”. Section 4 defines “property” as “include[ing] all personalty, i.e. land itself cannot be stolen but 
anything severed from the land (with the exception of wild flowers) can be stolen, as can intangible property such as a chose in action.”
149 See section 1 of the Theft (Amendment) Act of 1996, available at: http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1996/1996062.htm. There are now 
five offences, namely: Obtaining services by deception under section 1; evasion of liability by deception under section 2; obtaining 
property by deception under section 15; obtaining a money transfer by deception under sections 15A and 15B; and obtaining a pecuniary 
advantage by deception under section 16. It is also an offence to make off without paying. This does not require a deception. 
150 The Act also does not cover the use of improperly obtained passwords and identifiable information per se or its use to access data or 
information. It appears that that is left to other laws including the CMA and laws relating to trade secrets, confidential information, 
privacy and data protection.
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acts.151 It was introduced into the House of Lords on 25 May 2005 with the aim of 
modernizing the definitions of fraud, which have not been changed to take into 
consideration technological advances since 1968.152 The law will ensure that criminals 
utilizing technology to commit offences will not escape prosecution due to a loophole in the 
law based on outdated and narrow definitions. For example, under the current narrowly 
defined offences of deception in the Theft Acts, criminals operating online often escape 
prosecution, as their crime does not technically fall within the definition of the offence. 
The Act creates a general offence of fraud which can be committed in one of three ways: 
Firstly, false representation which this offence would also be committed by someone who 
engages in “phishing”: i.e. where a person disseminates an email to large groups of people 
falsely representing that the email has been sent by a legitimate financial institution. The 
email prompts the reader to provide information such as credit card and bank account 
numbers so that the “phisher” can gain access to others' personal financial information.” 153
secondly, failure to disclose information, and thirdly, abuse of position. Other new offences 
relating to obtaining services dishonestly,154 and possessing, making and supplying articles 
for use in fraud have also been created under the Bill.155 The wording of the Act has been 
specifically drafted to include online fraud and other offences involving the use of 
                                                
151 Bill 166 Sess. 2005-2006, available at the U.K. Parliament web site at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmbills/166/06166.i-i.html or 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmbills/166/2006166.pdf. For the latest updates, see: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/pabills/200506/fraud.htm. See further, the House of Lords Explanatory Notes on the Fraud 
Bill, available at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldbills/007/en/06007x--.htm; and the House of Commons 
Explanatory Notes on the Fraud Bill, available at: http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/cm200506/cmbills/166/en/06166x--.htm.
152 The Government’s Response to the views expressed in earlier consultations was published on the U.K. Home Office web site on 24 
November 2004, available at: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/cons-fraud-law-reform).
153 See the House of Lords Explanatory Notes on the Fraud Bill at para. 14; and the House of Commons Explanatory Notes on the Fraud 
Bill at para. 16. 
154 E.g. fraudulent credit card transactions on the Internet.
155 See, Susan Barty and Phillip Carnell, Fraud Bill Offers Protection from IT Fraud (dCode.co.uk, 11 July 2005), available at: 
http://www.dcode.co.uk/site/home/20050711fraud.html; or Susan Barty and Phillip Carnell, United Kingdom: New Protection Against 
Technology Abuse Under Government’s Fraud Bill (Mondaq, 5 July 2005), available 
at:http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=33546&lastestnews=1.
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technology. It is to be noted that fraud by false representation is committed irrespective of 
whether the intended victim is deceived. Hence, it has a pre-emptive effect similar to that 
which is offered in the United States Anti-Phishing Bill, and punishes an offender without 
requiring a victim to materialize in the first place. If and when it is passed, it will overtake 
many of the offences under the Thefts Act.156
Since the new Fraud Act come into force in early 2007, the aims to close a number of 
loopholes in preceding anti-fraud legislation, which the Government said was unsuited to 
modern fraud. The Act seeks to simplify the criminal law by creating a general offence of 
fraud, which may be committed in three different ways157. The Attorney General, Lord 
Goldsmith commented:
“This reform is needed to enable prosecutors to get to grips with the increasing abuse of 
new technology, particularly in relation to fake credit cards scams and personal identity 
theft, which cost millions of pounds every year”158. 
In the similar vein, the Home Office official said, “The introduction of a general fraud 
offence will improve the criminal law in a number of respects. It will simplify the law, 
making it clearer to juries and the general public as well as making the prosecution process 
more effective by providing a clear definition of fraud. Our aim is to encompass all forms 
of fraudulent conduct, with a law that is flexible enough to deal with developing 
technology, allowing us to bring more offenders to justice”159. Earlier, in its consultation 
paper the Home Office rejected calls for a specific offence to cover phishing, maintaining 
that this, “is an offence, or an attempted offence, of fraud under the current law” and that it 
                                                
156 Meanwhile, the United Kingdom recently folded its national computer crime unit, the National Hi-Tech Crime Unit, into a new agency 
known as the Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA); while the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) is sending its legal officers for 
special training on computer-related crimes in order to educate them on the technical aspects of such offences and to keep them abreast of 
developments so as to update their skills and knowledge in this area.
157 Ref Abu Bakar Munir, “Would the Phishers get Hooked”
158 See finextra.com, “UK Government Cracks Down on Phishers”, available at http://www.finextra.com/fullstory.asp?id=13735
159 See ZDNet.co.uk, “Government Moves to Tackle Phishing”, available at http://www.zdnet.co.uk/misc/print/0,000000169,39201079-
39001093c,00.htm
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would be caught by the proposed new offence created by the Bill. Section 1 of the Bill sets 
out a new general offence of fraud, the maximum penalty for which will be ten years’ 
imprisonment and a fine. There will be three different ways of committing the new offence 
and these are set out in Sections 2, 3 and 4 of the Act. They are fraud: (1) by false 
representation (Section 2); (2) by failing to disclose information (Section 3); and (3) by 
abuse of position (Section 4).
Section 2 covers phishing. Under this section, it will be an offence for a person to commit 
fraud by making a false representation dishonestly. Section 2(2) defines a representation as 
being “false” if it is untrue or misleading and the person making it knows that it is, or might 
be, so.
“Representation” is defined in Section 2(3) as any representation as to fact or law, 
including a representation as to a person’s state of mind. The representation may be 
expressed or implied.
Section 2 is drafted broadly so as to encompass fraudulent Internet and other activities such 
as phishing. The Act requires that the representation must be made dishonestly and it must 
be made with the intention of making a gain or causing loss or risk of loss to another,
regardless of whether the gain or loss actually takes place. The prosecution will not have to 
show that actual gain or loss took place. There is no limitation on the way in which the 
words must be expressed and that it could therefore be written, spoken or posted on a 
website. The explanatory notes states,” This offence would also be committed by someone 
who engages in phishing….”
Section 6 of the Fraud Act can be used against phishers as well. This clause seeks to make 
it an offence, punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment and a fine, for a person to have 
in his possession or under his control any article for use in the course of or in connection 
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with any fraud. Under this clause, it is an offence for phishers to have in his possession or 
under his control any software or trojan to be used to intercept communication between 
parties to glean information which he should not have access. This is relevant in relation to 
pharming and man-in the- middle-attack. As stated in the explanatory notes, the intention of 
section 6 is to cover a situation where the defendant had the article for the purpose of or 
with the intention that it be used in the course of or in connection with the offence, and that 
a general intention to commit fraud will suffice.
Another provision of the new law which is applicable to phishing is section 11. It is 
designed to make it an offence, punishable by up to five years imprisonment and a fine, for 
a person, by dishonest act, to obtain services for him or another person, for which payment 
is required, with intent to avoid paying the full amount required. For a prosecution to 
succeed it will have to be proved that the person knew when he obtained the services that 
payment was required or that it might be. Deception is not required under this new offence. 
The explanatory notes comments that the new offence will be committed only where the 
dishonest act was done with the intention of avoiding the expected payment for the services 
concerned. The explanatory notes states:
The offence is not inchoate; it requires the actual obtaining of the service. For example, 
data or software may be made available on the Internet to a certain category of person who 
has paid for access rights to that service. A person dishonestly using false credit card 
details or other false personal information to obtain the service would be committing an 
offence under this clause.
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5.2.3 The Singapore Model160
Unlike the United States and the approach taken by the CoE for the Cybercrime 
Convention, which combined computer crimes and cyber crimes in a single instrument, the 
Singapore legislature focused its efforts on producing a computer crime specific legislation, 
while attempting to leave cyber crime to be dealt with under its existing statutes through 
augmentation by amendment. Thus, it follows the United Kingdom model and approach to 
the problem. This stems from the perception that since the actual criminal acts relate to 
traditional offences, the inclusion of definitions and references to electronic modes of 
communication and commission of offences will be sufficient. However, as it will be 
shown in the case of phishing and similar offences of fraud involving identity theft, this 
approach is clearly inadequate as to its coverage under current legislation. It is also not able 
to satisfactorily meet public policy objectives such as crime deterrence, prevention and 
punishment. 
Like the United Kingdom, only computer crime is dealt with under the Computer Misuse 
Act (Cap. 50A) (CMA).161 Cyber crime remains to be dealt with under the provisions of the 
Penal Code (Cap. 224) and the provisions of a host of other legislations,162 which as stated 
                                                
160
Gregor Urbas, “An Overview of Cybercrime Legislation and Cases in Singapore”Asian Law Institute Working Paper Series No 001, 
Dec 2008
161 In summary, the CMA adopts four approaches to fight computer crimes: First, creating of new computer crimes for new problems that 
arise which require regulation; second, providing appropriate penalties as punishment and for deterrent effect, often increasing penalties, 
particularly in relation to the seriousness of the offence, such as the increased penalties where “damage” occurs (sentencing guidelines 
and policy further complement this approach); third, giving enhanced and specific powers of investigation to law enforcement agencies 
and creating specialised agencies with trained professionals and experts to deal with what are specialty crimes; and fourth, 
acknowledging the trans-national nature of such offences and its effects by giving extra-territorial effect to the offences under the Act and 
making it also an offence to abet and even to attempt the commission of such offences. The CMA further enhances computer security, by 
broadening the powers of the police to investigate such misdeeds and by giving it extra-territorial effect. In relation to law enforcement, 
on top of broader police powers, the Singapore government has also established specialized technology units to handle computer crime 
investigations. These are the Computer Crimes Branch of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), the Computer Forensics Branch 
of the Singapore Police Force (SPF), and the Singapore Computer Emergency Response Team (SingCERT) of the IDA. They were 
considered necessary to cope with the technological aspects of such cases and the increasing sophistication of computer programs and 
functions as well as of computer users. Finally, it is worth noting that section 4 of the CMA refers to offences involving “property”, 
“fraud” and “dishonesty” (all of which appear mostly in the cheating provisions) or which causes bodily harm (offences against the 
person). However, the prerequisite of a punishable 2-year jail term appears arbitrary.
162 E.g. the Miscellaneous Offences (Public Order and Nuisance) Act (Cap.184).
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are inadequate to deal with the problem in terms of both applicability and the effects of the 
punishment.163
The problem with relying on a legislation that was drafted before the electronic age, and 
that has not been amended, is that certain words and their interpretation do not apply to the 
electronic form of transacting or to such an environment. Under the current version of the 
Penal Code, the offence of cheating should apply to acts of phishing with the purpose of 
using stolen information for unlawful economic gain. A person cheats “by deceiving any 
person, [and] fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any 
property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or 
intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would 
not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to 
cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property.”164 The victim 
could be the person whose information is stolen, provided that such information can 
constitute “property” (which shall be an issue to be considered in relation to other property 
offences), or it could be the person or organization which is deceived or intentionally 
induced into transacting with the offender on the basis of that information (which can 
include banking and financial institutions, companies and business, and other forms of 
organization). 
The definition of “property” here is a crucial one in order for there to be an actionable 
offence of cheating in relation to the theft of the users or customers’ (the primary target) 
identity and other personal data and information such as passwords and identifiable codes 
                                                
163 This statement relates to the general criminal offence provisions under the Penal Code (Cap. 224) alone. There may be other 
provisions in specific legislation providing against fraud and fraudulent transactions pursuant to the use of stolen information that can 
cover phishing and related activities.
164 Section 415 of the Penal Code (Cap. 224).
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per se.165 In order for the scammer to face criminal prosecution in such a case, irrespective 
of any subsequent transaction on other forms of property occurring through the use of the 
identity or information, it must be accepted that personal data and information can 
constitute property. There is no general interpretation of “property” under the Interpretation 
Act (Cap 1). However, there is a definition of “immovable property” under section 2 of the 
Interpretation Act which “includes land, benefits to arise out of land and things attached to 
the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth”, and of “movable 
property” which means “property of every description except immovable property”. What 
“property of every description” means and whether it extends to personal data and 
information, and in particular, digital and electronic information, in the context of the Penal 
Code and other criminal provisions is still unclear. A purposive interpretation may still 
yield criminal recourse against perpetrators of phishing and similar offences.166 Certainly, it 
would appear that it is easier to prove cheating if a subsequent transaction on financial or 
tangible assets takes place through the use of such personal data or information, as can be 
seen in sections 421 to 424 which deals with fraudulent deeds and dispositions of property. 
However, they still relate to a different set of transactions.167 The offence of cheating also 
does not have the effect of pre-empting further offences from occurring such as by allowing 
for the prosecution of theft of data or information per se.
Unlike the cheating provisions, which can possibly still cover phishing and related scams, 
some other potential criminal offences are rendered inapplicable due to the limited scope of 
the “property” that forms the subject matter of the offence and one of its essential elements. 
                                                
165 Additionally, the spoofing of the target organization’s (the secondary target) web site can constitute copyright and trademark 
infringement under intellectual property laws.
166 Clarity in the law such as in the language of the criminal provisions themselves as well as explanatory notes and modern illustrations 
will be most useful to remove any ambiguities.
167 Forgery is another offence that can be applicable to cyber-fraud cases. It is a criminal offence to commit forgery for the purpose of 
Section 464 states that: “Whoever makes any false document or part of a document with intent to cause damage or injury to the public or 
to any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any express or implied 
contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed, commits forgery.” 
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The preamble to section 2 of the Interpretation Act states that the definitions contained 
within it are only applicable to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the 
construction due to the subject or context in which they appear or unless it is otherwise 
expressly provided. Section 22 of the Penal Code provides that “movable property” is 
intended to include “corporeal property of every description, except land and things 
attached to the earth, or permanently fastened to anything which is attached to the earth.” 
The ordinary meaning of “corporeal” is that which relates to, or has the characteristic of a 
material or tangible form. Personal information such as identity numbers and financial 
information do not appear to fall under this definition; neither will digital materials and 
property. Hence, it is unlikely that the offence of theft or criminal misappropriation of
property, for example, will be useful in relation to cyberspace transactions as these offences 
refer to “movable property” only.
We have seen in the context of the United States and the United Kingdom law, there are 
two levels to the problems relating to phishing and its progeny: Fraud and identity theft. 
The solution to fraud, whether or not it leads to the theft of other forms of property comes 
in the form of general criminal legislation, such as provisions under a Criminal Code; 
specific legislation, such as a Theft and/or Fraud Act, or both. Identity theft can also 
constitute a criminal offence if it is provided as such under legislation as the United States 
have done.168 Privacy and data protection laws as well as computer crime legislation also 
play a part if applicable to the fact situation. In Singapore’s case, the basis for a fraud or 
theft action of intangible property such as digital assets and personal information is archaic 
                                                
168 E.g. the United States’ Internet False Identification Prevention Act of 2000 and the Fraudulent Online Identity Sanctions Act of 2004 
(proposed amendment to the Trademark Act of 1946).
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and in need of reform, and there are no privacy or data protection laws against identity theft 
and personal data.169
There are also problems relating other subject matters of penal provisions to their digital 
analogues such as “book, paper, writing, valuable security or account”170 and 
“document”171.
On the other hand, it is to be noted that despite its deficiencies in cyber crime law making, 
the Singapore CMA has been constantly amended. However, the United Kingdom CMA is 
in the process of amendment. In particular, it incorporates denial of services attacks as a 
computer crime. It contains amendments to the CMA in Miscellaneous Part 5. It is likely to 
be accepted into law by the end of 2006. If it becomes law it will amend section 1(3) of the 
CMA by increasing the penalties for unauthorised access to computer material; section 3 of 
the CMA, by broadening the offence of unauthorised acts with intent to impair operation of 
computer to “any unauthorised act in relation to a computer”, which will widen the scope of 
the CMA to include denial of service attacks.172
5.3 Technical Measures
Phishing is a problem that exploits a weakness in the current state of technology and, in a 
manner of speaking, "uses it against us." It makes sense, then, that an effective solution to 
                                                
169 It is also an offence to cheat by personating under section 416 of the Penal Code (Cap. 224), punishable under section 419. However, 
it has to involve the impersonation of a “person”, whether real or imaginary, and does not extend to artificial entities or automatic agents. 
In Singapore, there is self-regulation in the private sector for some form of data protection but no general legal recourse, civil or criminal, 
for the taking of personal identifiable information per se.
170 See section 477A, which is a forgery offence that may be applicable, for example, to the case of the defrauding employee.
171 Which is defined under section 29 of the Penal Code as: “[A]ny matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters, 
figures or marks, or by more than one of those means, intended to be used, or which may be used, as evidence of that matter.”
Explanation 1 further states that: “It is immaterial by what means, or upon what substance, the letters, figures or marks are formed, or 
whether the evidence is intended for, or may be used in, a court of justice, or not.” Explanation 2 further states that: “Whatever is 
expressed by means of letters, figures or marks, as explained by mercantile or other usage, shall be deemed to be expressed by such 
letters, figures or marks within the meaning of this section, although the same may not be actually expressed.” However, this does not 
shed much light on whether electronic or digital forms of information or record are included in the definition. The Interpretation Act does 
not have a definition of “document”.
172. See, the Computer Misuse Act 1990 (Amendment) Bill. Bill 102 Sess. 2004-2005. See also, the U.K. Parliament web site at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmbills/102/2005102.htm. See, The Police and Justice Bill. Bill 119 Sess. 2005-06. 
See also, the U.K. Parliament web site at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmbills/119/2006119.htm. 
The Bill is now at the House of Lords Committee (see: http://www.lga.gov.uk/Legislative.asp?lsection=59&ccat=1156). See also, Bill 
Thompson, How to Legislate Against Hackers (BBC News, 13 March 2006), available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/4799338.stm.
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this problem should focus on repairing this weakness. One commentator described the 
technological weakness in this way:
“When the Internet was used mainly to communicate and access information, the lack of 
security didn't much matter. Now that it's used for online transactions and critical 
information, the absence of security is truly a big problem. It's as if consumers and 
businesses that rely on the Internet have wandered into a dangerous neighborhood of 
cheats, pickpockets and thieves, and don't even know it.”173
The U.S House of Representatives has offered this useful suggestion: "[t]here is no silver 
bullet to end spyware or phishing but greater consumer awareness and use of available 
technological countermeasures clearly hold the greatest promise for curbing these abusive 
practices."174
United States Congress's first recommendation is to increase "consumer awareness." To be 
sure, "common sense and a healthy level of suspicion go a long way toward not becoming a 
victim of phishing." Nevertheless, consumer awareness alone is not sufficient to solve the 
phishing problem. While it might be convenient to assume that only the gullible or Internet 
novices fall victim to phishing scams, the current state of technology and the phishers' 
ability to exploit it is such that even the most jaded and "web savvy" consumers can fall 
victim to a phishing scam.175 Consumer awareness must be coupled with technological 
improvements.
                                                
173 House of Representatives Government Reform Committee, Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations and the 
Census Committee Hearing, 108th Cong. 35-36 (2004), [hereinafter House Committee Hearing] (Testimony of Bill Conner, Chairman, 
President and CEO of Entrust, Inc. stating that "[j]ust as the Internet has supercharged commercial transactions, it has also supercharged 
cybercrime.") available at 2004 WL 2137978.
174 H.R. Rep No. 108-698, at 5
175 For an in-depth look at many of the possible ways that current phishers are defrauding consumers, see Gunter Ollman, Next 
Generation Security Software, Ltd., The Phishing Guide: Understanding & Preventing Phishing Attacks (Sep. 2004) available at 
http://www.nextgenss.com/papers/NISR-WP-Phishing.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2004) [hereinafter NGSS Whitepaper].
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A number of Internet-industry groups and technology companies have come out with 
specific recommendations for changes and improvements in the current Internet technology 
that they feel would reduce or even eliminate the phishing problem. These groups include 
the APWG, the Financial Services Technology Consortium, Next Generation Security 
Software Ltd., Yahoo! Inc. and Microsoft Corporation.
Judging from the number of different sources, there seems to be no shortage of 
recommendations for how to make the Internet and email more secure. The real questions 
seem to be (1) which recommendations should be implemented, (2) how should they be 
done, and (3) when? It is the lack of consensus on these details that has prevented us from 
already having the recommended upgrades. Despite the current disagreement, the rising 
tide of phishing scams is prodding the various groups to work together to implement 
changes to alleviate the problem.176
Leading the charge in calling for technology changes to combat phishing has been the 
APWG. In December 2003, the group proposed four possible technological solutions aimed 
at preventing phishing scams.177 These recommendations are: 
1. Strong Website Authentication. 
2. Mail Server Authentication. 
3. Digitally Signed Email with Desktop Verification. 
4. Digitally Signed Email with Gateway Verification.
The first recommendation, i.e strong website authentication, "would require all users of 
legitimate e-commerce and e-banking sites to strongly authenticate themselves to the site 
                                                
176 Thomas Claburn, E-Mail-Authentication Problems Spawn New Apps, InformationWeek, Sept.21, 2004, available at 
http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=47900731.
177 The Anti-Phishing Working Group, Proposed Solutions to Address the Threat of Email Spoofing Scams, Dec. 12, 2003
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using a physical token such as a smart card." In essence, this means that anyone wanting to 
bank or make purchases online from such websites would first need to swipe a card in a 
device connected to their computer before being allowed to do so. The APWG notes that 
this approach is feasible only "for e-commerce and e-banking applications that do not have 
a large number of users, and where the risk of a phisher gaining access to a user's account 
are high."178
The second recommendation, i.e mail server authentication, would require all email to pass 
through a gateway server for source verification. The APWG notes that the benefits of this 
approach include the ease with which it can be configured and the increased ability for 
legitimate business email to be identified. Potential drawbacks, however, include the facts 
that both sender and recipient gateways are required and that it does not accommodate e-
mail forwarding179. 
The third recommendation, i.e digitally signed email with desktop verification, would have 
companies that feel they are vulnerable to phishing attacks attach a digital signature to all 
their outbound email. The digital signature would then be verified for authenticity by the 
email client used by the recipient. In evaluating the pros and cons of using digital 
signatures, the APWG notes that this approach would make it impossible to forge the 
"From:" address without detection. However, it would still be possible for a phisher to 
obtain a valid digital certificate for a domain that is deceptively similar to that of a target 
company (e.g. the phisher could use "ebay.custservices.com," which is an entirely different 
domain from "ebay.com"). Concerning the use of the recipients' email client to verify the 




validity of the digital certificates, the main drawback is that not all email clients currently 
support the secure email standard that would be employed. 
The fourth recommendation, digitally signed email with gateway verification, is almost 
identical to the third recommendation; however, "instead of relying on the end user's email 
client to verify the signature on the email, a gateway server at the mail relay level would 
verify the signatures before they were even received by the receiver's email server." While 
this approach solves the problem of some recipients' use of email clients that do not support 
the digital certificate standard, it does not address the problem noted above regarding a 
phisher's possible use of a deceptively similar domain name.180
After providing a detailed and critical discussion of each recommendation the APWG 
concludes their analysis with the opinion that "a combination of signed email with desktop 
verification, and either gateway verification or mail server IP verification would solve all 
aspects of the phishing problem for both consumers and business users." Whether or not 
that prediction would eventually prove accurate, technological changes of the type 
recommended by the APWG are generally agreed to be a much needed step in the right 
direction to address the rising phishing problem.181
5.4 Conclusion
As we have seen, phishing and its progeny, require a different solution through legislative 
bait which the study had been made in the US, UK and Singapore law model. In order to 
fight such crimes effectively, a strong and robust international regime is needed; and one 
that is as far as possible harmonized.
                                                
180 Ibid
181 Financial Services Technology Consortium, Project Proposal: FSTC Counter-Phishing Initiative, 2004,p.5
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In order for there to be an effective global system to deal with the problem of computer-
related crimes, there must be all-around and appropriate approach using a combination of 
both legally coercive and non-legal measures especially technical software via the Anti-
Phishing Working Group (APWG) proposal. The four possible technological solutions 
including authentication and verification aimed at preventing phishing scams. The 
international legal framework should consist of approach to the problem with specific 
treaties for each subject area that is susceptible to universally consistent treatment and 
model laws in areas that do not, so as to promote as similar and consistent a set of laws as 
possible for each category of crime. In that way, the overall effect is optimized. 
